Key Takeaways

Sample Definition And Size

The study examines China's engagement in the UN Human Rights Council, focusing on its voting record and practices. The exact number of instances analyzed is not specified in the provided information.

Study Type

Observational study analyzing China's voting behavior and practices within the UN Human Rights Council.

Conflicts Of Interest

No conflicts of interest are declared in the provided information.

Results Summary

The study identifies four modes through which China pursues normative change in the UN Human Rights Council: mobilizing like-mindedness, implied coercion, tactical deception, and repression of critical voices. Specific statistics or effect sizes are not provided in the available information.

Abstract

Decades of social science research on human rights has mapped the conditions under which states sign and ratify treaties, abide by their conditions, and promote or criticize human rights in other states. Some norms contained in the core human rights treaties, particularly civil and political rights, are seen by authoritarian states as politically threatening. Autocracies can reshape human rights through international institutions and seek to change their content over time. This article investigates China's engagement in the UN Human Rights Council, focusing on both the content and practices of the People's Republic of China's approach. In terms of content, it examines China's voting record to determine the issues it prioritizes. In terms of practices, it identifies four modes of pursuing normative change: mobilizing like-mindedness, implied coercion, tactical deception, and repression of critical voices. These modes capture a range of activity in and around multilateral institutions, some of which usually does not draw scholarly attention in studies of normative change. The findings provide insights into the future of human rights norms in the United Nations and beyond.

Referenced In

RC Yu

8 months ago

Evidence & Public Policy

How do countries challenge human rights norms? (case of China)

Enjoyed this paper by Alexander Dukalskis. The paper (1) argues that, through the UN Human Rights Council, China aims to change international human rights norms; and (2) proposes four tactics China uses to make these changes.

(The author says this point 2 is his main contribution, as it's been studied less compared to point 1.)

The paper draws evidence from China's voting behaviour at the UN Human Rights Council.

On what norms China challenges:

"the PRC [a] keeps its own record out of the spotlight, [b] is hesitant to vote for resolutions that target one country, [c] advances norms associated with its conceptions of development and multilateralism, and [d] works against norms associated with liberal democracy."

On how China tries to challenge the norms:

"the “how” is characterized by four modes of action: [a] mobilizing like-minded states, [b] real or implied coercion, [c] tactical deception, and [d] repression of critical voices."

A clear, well evidenced, and well argued article.

A few quick reflections:

It's implied (I think, though not explicitly said) that the current norms are desirable, and conversely China's attempts to challenge norms are undesirable. I'd generally agree, but worth reflecting on some bits. For instance, more emphasis on a "right to development" could be useful, insofar as development can (of course not necessarily) facilitate the realisation of most other (including civil and political) rights. Of course, we can think about whether we can conceptualise a "right" to development (vs seeing development as a means to achieving other rights), but the practical question is: whether focusing more on "development" in human rights discourse is useful or not. The other instances of China's norm challenging seem more clearly (and blatantly) undesirable.
The fact that China (and probably other states) put much effort in defending it's record and challenging norms suggests that states do feel that norms affect them in some material ways (and perhaps in some less material ways e.g. "honor" / "face"). This could strengthen the case for the usefulness of defending (desirable) international norms. Also, would be interesting to explore what ultimately states like China care about.
If this analysis were to be done for 2025-2035 or so, how will the findings change? Would states like China care less about (unenforceable) intersectional norms, or perhaps take the opportunity to cement even more changes?

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Created: Sep 21, 2025