How do countries challenge human rights norms? (case of China)

Enjoyed this paper by Alexander Dukalskis. The paper (1) argues that, through the UN Human Rights Council, China aims to change international human rights norms; and (2) proposes four tactics China uses to make these changes.

(The author says this point 2 is his main contribution, as it's been studied less compared to point 1.)

The paper draws evidence from China's voting behaviour at the UN Human Rights Council.

On what norms China challenges:

"the PRC [a] keeps its own record out of the spotlight, [b] is hesitant to vote for resolutions that target one country, [c] advances norms associated with its conceptions of development and multilateralism, and [d] works against norms associated with liberal democracy."

On how China tries to challenge the norms:

"the “how” is characterized by four modes of action: [a] mobilizing like-minded states, [b] real or implied coercion, [c] tactical deception, and [d] repression of critical voices."

A clear, well evidenced, and well argued article.

A few quick reflections:

• It's implied (I think, though not explicitly said) that the current norms are desirable, and conversely China's attempts to challenge norms are undesirable. I'd generally agree, but worth reflecting on some bits. For instance, more emphasis on a "right to development" could be useful, insofar as development can (of course not necessarily) facilitate the realisation of most other (including civil and political) rights. Of course, we can think about whether we can conceptualise a "right" to development (vs seeing development as a means to achieving other rights), but the practical question is: whether focusing more on "development" in human rights discourse is useful or not. The other instances of China's norm challenging seem more clearly (and blatantly) undesirable.

• The fact that China (and probably other states) put much effort in defending it's record and challenging norms suggests that states do feel that norms affect them in some material ways (and perhaps in some less material ways e.g. "honor" / "face"). This could strengthen the case for the usefulness of defending (desirable) international norms. Also, would be interesting to explore what ultimately states like China care about.

• If this analysis were to be done for 2025-2035 or so, how will the findings change? Would states like China care less about (unenforceable) intersectional norms, or perhaps take the opportunity to cement even more changes?