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David J. Chalmers | The MIT Press eBooks | (1996)
Abstract
To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information.
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Sample Definition And Size
This is a theoretical/philosophical paper, not an empirical study; no sample or sample size is applicable.
Study Type
Philosophical/theoretical analysis (conceptual paper).
Conflicts Of Interest
No conflicts of interest are declared in the available metadata or abstract.
Results Summary
The paper distinguishes between the 'easy' problems of consciousness (e.g., discrimination, integration of information, reportability, attention, wakefulness) and the 'hard' problem (subjective experience or qualia). It argues that reductive physicalist approaches fail to explain the hard problem, and proposes a nonreductive, naturalistic account based on structural coherence, organizational invariance, and a double‑aspect theory of information.